Why the Judiciary Should Protect First Amendment Political Speech During Wartime: The Case for Deliberative Democracy by Derrick, Geoffrey J.
University of Lethbridge Research Repository
OPUS http://opus.uleth.ca
Undergraduate Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal (LURJ)
2007-06
Why the Judiciary Should Protect First
Amendment Political Speech During
Wartime: The Case for Deliberative Democracy
Derrick, Geoffrey J.
Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal
Derrick, Geoffrey J. (2007). Why the Judiciary Should Protect First Amendment Political Speech
During Wartime: The Case for Deliberative Democracy. Lethbridge Undergraduate Research
Journal, 1(2).
http://hdl.handle.net/10133/486
Downloaded from University of Lethbridge Research Repository, OPUS
 Home | Current Issue | Editorial Board | Instructions for Authors | Contact  
Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal 
ISSN 1718-8482  
Why the Judiciary Should Protect First 
Amendment Political Speech During 
Wartime : 
The Case for Deliberative Democracy  
Geoffrey J. Derrick   
Northwestern University  
Chicago Illinois USA  
Citation:  
Geoffrey J. Derrick: Why the Judiciary Should Protect First Amendment Political 
Speech During Wartime :The Case for Deliberative Democracy . Lethbridge 
Undergraduate Research Journal. 2007. Volume 2 Number 1. 
Table of Contents 
Abstract  
Introduction 
The Unclear & Present Danger Test: From  
The Normalization of Expansive—and Expanding—Executive Power 
Conclusion 
Endnotes 
Abstract 
The intersection of an individual's First Amendment right to political speech 
and the executive branch's war policy has been the subject of much recent 
scholarship. The unique challenges of the War on Terror have led Judge 
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit to adopt the view of the late Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquist that the judicial branch ought to adopt a 
deferential posture towards First Amendment rights during wartime. This 
paper responds by defending the value of open public debate about the 
war policy for three reasons: to uncover executive branch secrets, to clarify 
how peacetime First Amendment precedent like Brandenburg v. Ohio 
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applies during wartime, and to guard against the executive branch 
indefinitely asserting wartime powers during the War on Terror. 
Introduction 
The legislative branch has not provided an authoritative check on the 
executive branch during and after national emergencies because hysteria and 
fear, rather than reasoned debate, have framed Congressional debates about 
expanding executive power. By truncating discussions about new war powers, 
legislators have provided little, if any, substantive restraint on the executive 
branch. In the absence of a good-faith review of the executive branch's war 
powers by the legislature, the judicial branch becomes the most important 
institutional restraint by default. Unfortunately, the judiciary has also deferred 
broadly to the President and unevenly balanced national security and individual 
liberty during wartime. 
Deference, the judicial branch's hands-off approach to the executive 
branch's power during wartime, has consistently contravened free speech. 
Wartime courts have rejected the proposition of this paper that the First 
Amendment guarantees communicative liberty for all citizens even during times 
of emergency or war. The judicial branch has not gone far enough in protecting 
a forum for citizens to disagree with the executive branch's war policy. A 
responsible separation of powers requires the courts to scrutinize the 
executive's wartime powers in light of Congress' legislation authorizing 
extraordinary war powers.  
The First's Amendment's most important role is to ensure self-governance, 
the core value from which numerous other constitutional guarantees stem. The 
exchange of ideas by citizens in the public forum is essential to deliberative 
democracy. This paper adheres to the formulation of Cass Sunstein who 
argues that debates about the war policy “provide the key safeguard against 
senseless cascades” and “open up space for dissent by forbidding government 
from mandating conformity or insulating itself, and citizens generally, from …
opinions.” 1 If the judicial branch is to remain the active guarantor of minority 
viewpoints that it has been since United States vs. Carolene Products (1939), 2 
it must more actively insist upon a presumption of unconstitutionality for 
executive action that abridges the public's right to know and discuss the war. 
This would require the court to more actively validate First Amendment claims 
in the face of executive branch secrecy instead of deferring during wartime.  
Justice Harlan Stone's fourth footnote in the Carolene Products majority 
opinion introduced a new theory of judicial review in which the court subjected 
laws to a more demanding scrutiny if they are aimed at “discrete and insular 
minorities.” Citizens who choose to dissent or question the war policy are part 
of a political minority whose opinions are often under siege by the executive 
Page 2 of 18Why the Judiciary Should Protect First Amendment Political Speech During Wartime
8/31/2007http://www.lurj.org/article.php/vol2n1/firstamend.xml
branch. To ensure that Justice Stone's theory does not disappear in 
wartime, the modern judicial branch needs to assert review power over 
legislation, like the USA PATRIOT Act, that expands executive authority at the 
expense of communicative liberty. The courts must more forcefully protect the 
dissenting minority during wartime with the artillery of First Amendment 
precedent. 
While Carolene Products was not deciding during wartime or with regard to 
the First Amendment, it has generally allowed for a more profound reading of 
the Bill of Rights in wartime. This reading, a noteworthy example of when the 
judicial branch correctly asserted its independence from the executive branch, 
was adopted in several influential First Amendment opinions such as 
Korematsu v. United States (1942, Justice Jackson and Justice Murphy's 
dissents), Dennis v. United States (1951, Justice Douglas' dissent), 
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969, Justice Douglas' concurrence), and New York 
Times v. United States (1971, Justice Black's concurrence). As time passed 
between the “darkest days of World War II” 3 and the waning pressures from the 
Vietnam War, the judiciary gradually accepted the public's right to information 
about the war. As the hysteria subsided, the judicial branch chipped-away at 
the executive's power in the rare circumstances where it went beyond 
Congress' authorization. However, many of the dissenting and concurring 
opinions of Justices during this period are not controlling First Amendment 
precedent. Rarely has a wartime court spoken together to strongly defend the 
core principles of pluralism and respect for dissenters that are at the heart of 
the First Amendment.  
This paper rebuts the thesis of modern executive power posited by United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner 4 and 
former Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. 5 Rehnquist argues 
that “The laws will not be silent in a time of war, but they will speak with a 
somewhat different voice.” 6 Similarly, Posner explains the “The scope of a right 
must be calibrated …[as] the point of balance …shifts continuously [and] 
threats to liberty and safety wax and wane.” 7 The Rehnquist/Posner theory that 
“Security is the very precondition for freedom” 8 is unfavorable because it 
denies the possibilities that, during wartime, dissent may improve national 
security or that judicial deference may endanger deliberative democracy.  
Posner is correct that judges should not be in the business of adjudicating 
national security issues because such an inquiry would require the disclosure of 
sensitive information. However, the judicial branch has the opportunity to 
forward a more nuanced First Amendment defense of the public's right to know 
and discuss the war policy without involving itself in these sticky security 
questions. This paper concludes that the Rehnquist/Posner theory of executive 
power is self-sealing because it disavows the need for institutional checks and 
balances such as public or judicial scrutiny of the war policy. This paper will 
show that the empirical result of a judiciary that willfully trusts the executive 
branch during wartime has been a breakdown in public knowledge, discussion 
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and criticism of the war.  
Rehnquist asks, “may it not actually be desirable” for the judicial branch “to 
avoid decision on [civil liberties] claims during” until “after the war is over”? 9 
This question blurs Rehnquist's supposed distinction between his theory and 
the classic Latin phrase “inter arma silent leges”—during war the laws are 
silent. This paper argues that there is a limited yet important role for the judicial 
branch during wartime: to ensure self-government via the freedom of 
information and debates about the war. Posner concludes that this 
recommendation is unnecessary because “Every time civil liberties have been 
curtailed in response to a national emergency, whether real or imagined, they 
have been fully restored when the emergency passed—and in fact before it 
passed, often long before.” 10 However, section IV takes the opposite position 
that judicial deference to the executive branch during wartime has resulted in 
an improper balance of security and liberty even after the end of the war. The 
need for a more active judicial branch in wartime is manifest in three historical 
trends: (1). The veil of secrecy imposed by the executive branch on wartime 
information and debate during the Cold War, the Vietnam War and the War on 
Terror, (2). The judicial branch's inconsistent application of the “clear and 
present danger” test during World War I, World War II and the Cold War, and 
(3). The executive branch's assertion of emergency powers before and after the 
temporal boundaries of the French-American War, the Civil War and World War 
I. 
Persecution: Making the War a Secret 
Executive branch secrecy prevents citizens from participating in their own 
governance. Sunstein argues that “Above all, the Constitution attempts to 
create a deliberative democracy …that combines accountability to the people 
with a measure of reflection and reason-giving.” 11 As mentioned above, Posner 
argues that the executive branch rightly keeps its activities secret during 
wartime because public discussion of such activities would endanger national 
security. However, executive branch secrecy in the twentieth century has more 
directly threatened self-government by controlling what citizens can know about 
the war policy. The executive branch has employed a variety of repressive 
tactics including censorship, propaganda, prosecution or persecution. Natan 
Sharansky writes that “The power of fear” is based on “a regime's ability to 
control what is read, said, heard, and above all, thought.” 12 These fear-
producing tactics have deterred unknowledgeable citizens from questioning 
national security experts. Simply put, a reasonable understanding of the 
government's war policy is a necessary precondition for disagreeing with it or 
having an educated discussion about it.  
The executive branch contends that national security information is meant to 
be discussed in the technical sphere by experts rather than the public sphere 
by ordinary citizens. During the last half-century, the judicial branch has slowly 
incorporated substantive First Amendment protections against this brand of 
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executive secrecy. The Court ought to go further and adopt a heavy 
presumption against restrictions on information that is vital for the public to 
think, discuss, and speak in a reasoned and well-informed way about the war, 
similar to how the court in New York Times v. United States rejected prior 
restraints on political speech. The need for judicial efforts to counteract 
executive branch secrecy is best understood by examining Congress' 
persecution of American communists during the Cold War, the Supreme Court's 
commitment to transparent government in New York Times v. United States, 
and Posner's comments about the role of the judicial branch in the current War 
on Terror.  
The Cold War demonstrates that the legislature cannot be trusted to fairly 
moderate the marketplace of ideas during wartime. The House Un-American 
Activities Committee's (HUAC) hearings, inflamed by Senator McCarthy's 
vitriolic anti-communism, put a spotlight of publicity on dissenters. Geoffrey 
Stone notes that government-sanctioned persecution in the public forum was a 
new turn in repression since World War II. 13 Interestingly, Martin Redish has 
written that “There now appears to be little question that many of the allegations 
of espionage made during the 1940s that seems wild to many were, in fact, 
completely accurate.” 14 Nonetheless, he concludes that the legislature should 
not be in the business of justifying viewpoint-based restrictions on expression 
because “Democracy …inherently requires that sovereignty ultimately reside in 
the people.” 15 HUAC condemned critical thinking about the Cold War, causing 
a lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union and the nature of the communist 
threat. It is thus not difficult to understand how the Comintern and Venona 
documents—the evidence of American communism during the Cold War—
revolutionized a field of historical scholarship that had been based on 
misinformation because of executive branch secrecy. If the public had been 
privileged to this information at the time of the HUAC hearings, the case for 
anti-communism would have been clearer. Instead, the executive branch, under 
the thumb of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, hid its wartime activities and 
persecuted those who legitimately questioned the war. 
The real threat of persecution during the Cold War came from private 
actors, not the government. The legislature chose to expose supposed 
American communists in the public forum because the HUAC could not 
authorize legal prosecutions in light of the First Amendment right to free 
association. Cold War persecution represented a new and more indirect 
avenue for the government to regulate expression; one that was equally as 
subversive as sedition legislation because it chilled the willingness of citizens to 
enter discussions about the war for fear of being seen as un-American or the 
enemy. HUAC carried the power of a legislative enactment because private 
business, religious, and political groups sanctioned dissenters with loyalty oaths 
and blacklists. Redish notes, “Although the constitutional guarantee of free 
expression restricts what government may do, it is, paradoxically, the very 
same right that justifies the exclusion of private actors from the scope of the 
[First] Amendment's restrictions.” 16 The executive branch's strategy of 
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encouraging private non-association through Congressional persecution 
was, at its core, an effort to create ideological conformity against communism. 
The government's pursuit of communism was kept secret for thirty years, 
skewing historical interpretations of the period. The result of executive secrecy 
was to distort the public forum with misinformation. The enduring lesson of the 
Cold War is that a democracy is a two-way street: if the government can make 
the private lives of its citizens into public knowledge, then citizens can also 
petition the government for information about the war. 
Realizing this, dissenters to the Vietnam War relied heavily on the public 
forum and “the great benefit of vigorous debate …to educate citizens about the 
issues.” 17 The public's understanding of the Vietnam War was rarely advanced 
by congressional investigations of the executive branch. Political pressure 
restrained legislators from authorizing legitimate inquiries into the executive 
branch's conduct during and after the war. The executive branch used 
programs like COINTELPRO and Project MERRIMAC to “disrupt,” “intercept,” 
“harass,” “sabotage,” and “assault” members of the New Left who opposed the 
Vietnam War. 18 The secrecy of the Nixon Administration during the Vietnam 
War presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to protect the public's 
First Amendment right to fully understand and discuss the executive branch's 
war policy.  
The Court in New York Times v. United States (1971)—the Pentagon 
Papers case—held that the Nixon Administration could not enjoin the New York 
Times and Washington Post from punishing the Pentagon Papers and, more 
importantly, that no information short of that which directly endangers national 
security could be enjoined from dissemination in the public forum. As a result, 
the public was exposed to deep and troubled history of the executive branch's 
inner-workings during the Vietnam War, putting the government under a higher 
level of public scrutiny than ever before. The press' victory strengthened the 
notion that it was not only the right but also a central purpose of the free press 
to scrutinize government. The court's short and quickly issued per curiam 
opinion in the Pentagon Papers case denouncing prior restraints gave new 
weight to the First Amendment freedom of the press. Justice Black later wrote 
that “the Founding Fathers gave the Free Press the protection it must have to 
fulfill its essential role in our democracy …to inform the people.” 19 Justice 
Douglas agreed: “Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, 
perpetuating bureaucratic errors.” 20 By releasing the Pentagon Papers for full 
public assessment in the marketplace of ideas, the court affirmed that the First 
Amendment fully protects the public's right to monitor the executive branch 
during wartime.  
The public's check is crucial because, as Sunstein argues, “diversity-
building practices counteract the human tendency to conform,” especially when 
“social influences” like the exigencies of war “threaten …to lead individuals and 
institutions in the wrong directions.” 21 New York Times v. United States “stands 
as a dramatic symbol of the constitutional protection afforded to disclosure and 
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dissent.” 22 Steven Shiffrin, quoting Harry Kalven, writes that New York 
Times v. United States “may prove to be the best and most important [decision 
the Court] has ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech” because it 
“almost literally incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that in a democracy 
the citizen as ruler is our most important public official.” 23 Meiklejohn's self-
governance theory asserted absolute protection for political speech because it 
was at the heart of self-governance. Three separate theories of free speech 
underpin Meiklejohn's argument: Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' belief that 
dissent contributes to the realization of truth in the marketplace of ideas, 
Sunstein's emphasis on deliberation in the marketplace, and Shiffrin's theory of 
questioning accepted conventions. Executive branch secrecy during wartime 
flies in the face of these three positions because it impedes citizens from 
participating in their own governance. The executive branch's reckless 
persecution of dissent during the Cold and Vietnam Wars demonstrates that the 
tactics for deterring citizens from speaking about the war had changed from 
overt sedition legislation to more indirect, extra-legal methods. 
In the current War on Terror, for example, state district courts cited the 
threat of terrorism in allowing the executive branch to use time, place and 
manner (TPM) restrictions—”free speech zones” or “protest pens”—to limit the 
communicative liberty of activists at the Democratic and Republican National 
Conventions. 24 The court's noninterference with these TPM restrictions has had 
a chilling effect on political expression under the First Amendment by giving 
protesters a strong incentive to stay home. Richard Leone has observed that “it 
is alarming how little public deliberation has occurred” during the “tumultuous 
post-9/11 period.” 25 TPM restrictions show that the executive branch has been 
able to silence dissenters during wartime by increasing the deterrent to speech. 
It is the job of the judicial branch to reign in TPM restrictions when they 
contravene the First Amendment guarantee of a robust public debate about the 
War on Terror. Unlike the Cold War, the executive branch did not persecute 
dissenters through the publicity of congressional hearings; rather, the executive 
branch has deployed the FBI to watch and disrupt dissenters with more discrete 
deterrents to dissent such as TPM restrictions. 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, defending warrantless wiretapping, said 
that the program “does not invade anyone's privacy, unless you are talking to 
the enemy in this time of war.” 26 Similarly, Posner's opinion in Alliance to End 
Repression v. City of Chicago (2004) validated police wiretaps, profiling and 
infiltration of Muslim groups as a necessary function of the War on Terror. 
Posner, like the majority in Dennis and Attorney General Gonzalez, is willing to 
obfuscate the First Amendment's clear distinction between incitement—speech 
that provokes imminent lawless action—and advocacy—speech that does not 
produce such action—if the exigencies of wartime are present. Posner 
authorized the Chicago Police Department to surveil all potential terrorists 
because he trusts that they will not unnecessary infringe upon suspects' rights. 
However, it does not follow why citizens should blindly trust the executive 
branch to conduct the War on Terror given the long history of deception 
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discussed herein. Without the converse of a public right to information about 
the war, the executive branch becomes self-sealing. The Pentagon Papers 
decision set the precedent that the judicial branch would not simply take the 
executive at its word and defer during wartime; it left more room for judges to 
balance civil liberties on par with security.  
With respect to balancing, Posner argues that “cases involving a clash 
between liberty and safety cannot yet be governed by rules.” 27 However, it is 
the lack of a categorical rule against the suppression of wartime dissent that 
had led judges to decide wartime First Amendment claims in an ad hoc 
manner. Section III will discuss how the differential application of the clear and 
present danger test over time has led judges to disregard or misapply First 
Amendment precedent during wartime. Posner argues that there should be an 
exception to the Brandenburg rule 28 for “speech that preaches holy war against 
the west.” 29 This case-by-case evaluation of speech acts cuts against the First 
Amendment's core value of tolerance. Posner' language is telling: “the 
government should not have to stand by helplessly while radical imams convert 
a multitude to their radical creed.” 30 This idea that any Muslim is inherently 
dangerous because he or she could be compelled to conduct radical Islamic 
terrorism assumes that words are triggers to action and that advocacy is 
equivalent to incitement. The courts ought to clarify this distinction in the War 
on Terror to ensure that the Brandenburg test doesn't revert back to the “bad 
tendency” 31 in future wars.  
The Supreme Court recently explained how the traditional laws of war will 
apply to the War on Terror in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), rebuking the 
executive ability to create military courts without consulting Congress. 32 This 
ruling speaks to Posner's argument that “It is much easier for judges to tell the 
government what not to do than what to do.” 33 As such, the courts need to 
continue to hear cases that challenge the limits of executive branch authority in 
the War on Terror. Posner disagrees, arguing that the judiciary would be 
overburdened if it were charged with “trundling out the heavily artillery of 
constitutional invalidation” during the War on Terror. This view of judicial 
authority is profoundly limited. In order for secrets to enter the public forum and 
for dissenters to receive the appropriate protection from the tactics of executive 
suppression, the judicial branch must remain far more active in wartime than 
the Rehnquist/Posner theory advocates. 
The Unclear & Present Danger Test: From 
Schenck to Dennis to Brandenburg  
While the Supreme Court's majority consistently applied the bad tendency 
test to uphold prosecutions for espionage and seditious advocacy during World 
War I, some of the court's dissenting opinions began to reveal judicial 
independence from the executive branch. Dissenting judges, particularly 
Justice Holmes, introduced a discussion about the role of the First Amendment 
for the first time in the history of the judicial branch. This was the first time that 
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any member of the court adjudicated speech prosecutions as a matter of 
First Amendment rights rather than criminal law. The “clear and present danger 
test” created by Justice Holmes' majority in Schenck relied heavily on the 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor to buttress its claim that the public sphere was 
an inherent good, rather than a necessary evil, of democratic governance. In 
his dissent in Abrams v. Unites States (1919), Justice Holmes wrote that “the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by the free trade in ideas – that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market.” 34 This metaphor for free expression in the public sphere 
endured in the court's decision-making for fifty years until Brandenburg (1969). 
David Rabban concludes that “The modern civil liberties movement emerged 
during and after World War I” because the clear and present danger test 
“created a broader and more powerful constituency prepared to support 
freedom of expression.” 35 The vacillation of the clear and present danger test 
demonstrates, that an active judicial branch can protect communicative liberty 
in the face of executive branch suppression. This section proceeds by 
discussing the influences of progressive social thinkers on the clear and 
present danger test, the test's distinction—or lack thereof— between advocacy 
and incitement in Dennis, and the broad protection afforded to dissent in 
Brandenburg.  
The division before World War I between radical libertarians who favored 
individual rights and progressives who favored the “common good” led to the 
first public and judicial debates about the meaning of the First Amendment. 
These debates embodied the First Amendment's commitment to pluralism by 
allowing multiple perspectives to enter the decision-making process. Never 
before Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams had any judge discussed speech 
outside on the strictures of traditional criminal law and the law of “attempt,” i.e. 
the bad tendency test. 36 Stone and Rabban argue that Justice Holmes' attitude 
about the clear and present danger test changed markedly between his 
Schenck majority and his Abrams dissent.  
Justice Holmes' progressivism with respect to speech rights was influenced 
by Zachariah Chaffee, Ralph Waldo Emerson, John Dewey, and other social 
thinkers at the turn of the twentieth century. The publication of personal 
correspondences between Judge Learned Hand and Justice Holmes reveals 
the large influence that Judge Hand had on Justice Holmes' commitment to free 
and open public discussion. Before being exposed to these ideas, Holmes' 
published The Common Law in 1881 and characterized free speech as an 
issue of criminal law and nothing else. He counseled judges to ask: what 
actions will occur as the result of speech and are they punishable? Judge 
Hand's opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten (1917) was the immediate 
precedent for Holmes' analysis in Schenck. In Masses, Judge Hand created a 
specific standard for incitement during wartime: to “counsel or advise violations 
of law” would be equivalent to the “direct advocacy of resistance to enlistment” 
of troops. 37 Justice Holmes agreed with this interpretation in Schenck, arguing 
that there the substantive evil of draft obstruction was uniquely heightened 
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during wartime and that a speaker's intent could be determined based on 
the “inevitable result” the speech. It retained the substantive aspects of the bad 
tendency test and simply cast them in new language. However, in Abrams after 
the end of World War I, Justice Holmes changed his position, arguing that the 
danger produced by advocacy must be “immediate” and “imminent” in order to 
prosecute speech in wartime. Shiffrin notes, “Emerson may have celebrated a 
mythical American, but they celebrated an American who was not wedded to 
the comforts of the present nor tied to the bonds of the past. They celebrated 
the courage of the nonconformist, the iconoclast, the dissenter …And, with Mill, 
they sponsored nonconformity.” 38 In this way, Justice Holmes' application of 
clear and present danger in Abrams cut against judicial deference and set the 
stage for further scrutiny of the executive branch during peacetime. 
Because of the uneven application of the test by Justice Holmes in Schenck 
and Abrams, future judges were unsure about when and how to apply its 
“immediate” and “imminent” language. While Justice Holmes' opinions were 
monumental in breaking the mold of criminal law, they “introduce a long line of 
cases dealing with the advocacy of illegal action” that are “simply depressing” 
because “Only rarely did judges transcend the censoring passions of the day.” 
39 Rabban notes that, “lower court decisions make clear that Holmes' first 
Espionage Act opinions, resembling his prewar decisions, were in the 
repressive mainstream, not the libertarian vanguard.” 40 This lack of clarity 
persisted for decades until 1951 when the judicial branch in Dennis 
demonstrated a profound unwillingness to differentiate the clear and present 
danger from bad tendency and incitement from advocacy. 
Justice Fred Vinson's majority opinion, relying on a clear and present 
danger analysis, validated the persecution of public citizens for their 
associations with the American Communist Party. Dennis, as Rabban argues, 
“marked both the apex and the turning point of the Supreme Court's reliance on 
the clear and present danger test” because it had become so differently applied 
that it was no longer coherent. 41 The majority treated constitutionally-protected 
advocacy of communism as punishable incitement. Rabban notes, “the 
Supreme Court reverted to the restrictive interpretation of clear and present 
danger that marked its original formulation by Holmes in Schenck.” 42 Instead of 
moving forward with Justice Holmes' marketplace of ideas metaphor in the 
mold of his Abrams dissent, subsequent courts slowly became more and more 
deferential to the executive in their application of the clear and present danger 
test. Judge Hand and Justice Holmes should be honored for their First 
Amendment foresight and commitment to peacetime speech rights. They were 
willing to protect communicative liberty generations before such views became 
the judicial mainstream. Section II concluded that the persecution strategies 
pursued by the executive branch during the Cold War, affirmed in Dennis, were 
substantive limits on democratic deliberation. The executive branch was so 
successful in curtailing American communism because the judicial branch 
affirmed that the executive can, in the interests of the war effort, assert 
“monopoly control” over the marketplace of ideas.  
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Luckily, the court in Brandenburg affirmed the opposite: that multiple, 
clashing perspectives in the public forum can guard against the dissemination 
of widespread propaganda and secrecy by the executive branch. Ed Baker, 
summarizing Justice William O. Douglas' dissent in Korematsu, describes the 
logic adopted by the Brandenburg majority: “without free speech, totally false 
heretical opinions which could not survive open discussion will not disappear; 
instead, driven underground, these opinions will smolder, their fallacies 
protected from exposure and opposition.” 43 In Brandenburg the judicial branch 
chose to set a prohibitively high bar for executive branch suppression of dissent 
during wartime. The ruling rightly clarified the court's various clear and present 
danger analyses from 1919-1969, ensuring that the rule would not devolve 
backwards into a bad tendency test as it had in Dennis. With such sweeping 
protection for communicative liberty, the judicial branch encouraged more, not 
fewer, voices to enter debates about the war policy because the 
“understandings resulting from [a] robust debate will depend on the …quantity 
of inputs.” 44 The ebb and flow of the clear and present danger test underscores 
the unique vulnerability of communicative liberty during wartime and the need 
for judicial clarity on the issue of political speech. 
Holmes' marketplace metaphor did not provide that clarity; however, it did 
begin a debate within the judicial branch about the meaning of the First 
Amendment and the relationship between speech and crime. By casting the 
public sphere in an understandable economic language, Holmes was able to 
articulate the social value to pluralism and debate is the clearest possible 
terms. Sunstein explains: “Well-designed market mechanisms can be helpful in 
ensuring that information is disclosed. Free societies depend on a high degree 
of receptivity, in which many perspectives are heard and in which dissent and 
disagreement are not unwelcome.” 45 However, the inequities of the economic 
marketplace have also limited the communication of ideas. Baker argues, “the 
market is doubly determined to appeal successful …those groups who most 
frequently participate in the marketplace find that it ‘correctly' advances their 
interests or views; and …the marketplace validates those views that generally 
appear to be correct; that is, it reinforces currently dominant views.” 46 Because 
of such inequities in the public forum, the judicial branch must intercede and 
moderate the discussion during wartime. It must fight for the rights of the 
minority groups to valuably contribute in the marketplace. Without a judicial 
ruling that explains how the Brandenburg test will apply during wartime, it is 
possible that bad tendency could test could once again reappear and suppress 
legitimate dissent in the War on Terror. 
The Normalization of Expansive—and 
Expanding—Executive Power 
Stone explains that “wartime” connotes a period of “armed conflict,” 
“emergency” and a situation that requires “immediate executive action, often 
without time for deliberation.” 47 Wartime is by definition distinct from peacetime 
and the everyday operation of government. A primary tenet of First Amendment 
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jurisprudence is its dichotomy between times of peace and times of war, 
with the former constituting the norm and the latter the exception to the norm. 
However, the commonsense distinction between war and peace has become 
blurred by the political climate and social pressure of wartime. Considering the 
first wars which affected constitutional interpretation in the United Stated, the 
executive branch assumed wartime powers before and after the temporal 
boundaries of the French-American War, the Civil War and World War I. 
Understanding executive branch activity during these historical conflicts will 
help inform the more complex issue of executive authority in the War on Terror. 
In order to properly restrain the executive from elongating its emergency 
powers in the War on Terror, the judicial branch must closely monitor the length 
of the war. If the War on Terror continues without end, the judicial branch will 
be charged with curtailing executive branch authority when there exigency from 
terrorism becomes less severe. 
During the United States' first wars, the executive branch propagated the 
notion that any citizen who disagreed with the war policy was disloyal to the 
nation. The judicial and legislative branches established the executive's 
inherent wartime power to prosecute dissent as a necessary means of 
preserving national unity. Such restrictions on speech had a lasting, not 
temporary, effect on First Amendment expression because they extended and 
normalized the executive's wartime powers to apply even in the absence of 
armed conflict. This effort to bridge wartime and peacetime, to assume 
extraordinary authority before and after the war, can be understood by 
examining three historical episodes: (1). President Adams original support for 
silencing his Anti-Federalist opponents for the sake of national unity, (2). 
President Lincoln's indirection regulation of speech by persuading citizens to 
accept broad executive power during the Civil War, and (3). President Wilson's 
propaganda control over what speech could enter the public forum during 
World War I. 
Although no consensus about free speech emerged from the French-
American War, if there actually was a War, a certain conclusion is that the 
judiciary tends qualify peacetime rights by erring too much on the side of 
security and the need for immediate executive action during wartime. President 
Adams and the Federalists institutionalized a broad theory of wartime executive 
power later employed during the Civil War and World War I. 48 During debates 
over the Sedition Act of 1798 Federalists such as Congressman Allen from 
Connecticut ostracized Anti-Federalists to secure political advantage, accusing 
them of “acting under the influence of French diplomatic skill.” 49 The result was 
a prohibition on public debate about the war, confusing loyalty to Adams' war 
policy with loyalty to the nation at a critical time when the first Congressional 
discussions about the meaning of the First Amendment were occurring. Stone 
argues that the enduring lesson of the war is that “when we act in the heat of 
war fever, we may overact …Fear, anger and an aroused patriotism can 
undermine sound judgment.” 50 The Federalists' strong-armed political 
opponents and truncated debates in Congress and in the judiciary about the 
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enforcement of the Sedition Act. The Act set a precedent that, regardless of 
whether or not the national interest is served by suppressing dissent, the 
executive has the inherent power to eliminate public criticism as legitimate 
function of waging war. As such, the judiciary should be culpable for allowing 
the prosecutions under the Sedition Act and expanding wartime executive 
power at the expense of the First Amendment. 
To be clear, it was during the war—not before or after—when Adams 
overreacted to the French threat and unnecessarily prosecuted his Anti-
Federalist critics. The Sedition Act expired on the final day of Adams' term in 
office and newly elected President Jefferson “pardoned all those who had been 
convicted under the [Act] and freed all those still in jail.” 51 While the Act had 
only a temporary effect on expressive freedoms, it ensured that the executive 
branch possessed the capacity under law to treat individual rights like free 
speech as subservient to the war policy. The expansive deference to the 
executive in the French-American War heightened the risk that future 
Presidents might try to artificially exercise wartime powers in half-wars, or times 
of conflict that might more closely resemble peacetime.  
Sixty years later, President Lincoln revived the debate over executive power 
and free speech by suspending the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War. 
By putting executive power at the center of debates about wartime free speech 
rights, Lincoln persuasively advocated for a more broad interpretation of 
wartime power than even the Federalists had supported. While Lincoln was not 
concerned with regulating speech and Congress did not legislate against 
sedition, the President's generals independently prosecuted citizens in military 
courts without regard for the full guarantees of the First Amendment. In denying 
Clement Vallandingham's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, civilian court 
Judge Leavitt warned against “the dangerous consequences of these disloyal” 
speeches and charged General Burnside to “suppress them.” 52 Such a show of 
deference to military courts was indicative of the judiciary's hands-off approach 
to the First Amendment during the Civil War; an approach very different from 
the more active subversion by Federalists like Justice Samuel Chase. The 
judicial branch during the Civil War affirmed the executive's inherent authority to 
make individual rights subservient to preserving the union. Luckily, many of 
those convicted were let free at Lincoln's demand. Still, the legislative branch, 
which ratified Lincoln's suspension of the writ, and the judicial branch, which 
further normalizing Federalist notions of deference to the executive during 
wartime, must take responsibility for allowing the military to suppress speech 
despite Lincoln's good intentions. 
Lincoln should be applauded for refocusing debates about free speech 
during wartime to address the larger issue of executive power. Lincoln's 
appreciation for criticism and political debate is most clear in his letter to 
Erastus Corning: “these safe-guards of the rights of the citizen against the 
pretensions of arbitrary power, were intended more especially for his protection 
in times of civil commotion …I too am devotedly for them after civil war, and 
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before civil war, and at all times ‘except when, in cases of Rebellion of 
Invasion, the public Safety may require' their suspension.” 53 This nuanced and 
speech-protective interpretation of the First Amendment is admirable in light of 
“the extraordinary complexities of a civil war, the well-founded anxieties about 
sabotage, desertion, and draft evasion.” 54 Unlike Adams and the Federalists, 
Lincoln invited dissent from political opponents and was not concerned with 
regulating seditious speech for partisan reasons. 
However, because Lincoln so successfully argued that habeas rights were 
subordinate to wartime exigencies, President Wilson used similar arguments to 
justify curtailing free speech in World War I. Wilson's stated desire to eliminate 
disloyalty—i.e. critical debates about American involvement in World War I—
prior to a Congressional declaration of war was an unprecedented widening of 
wartime executive power beyond the temporal boundaries of the war. Unlike 
Lincoln, Wilson “was a man with little tolerance for criticism” who remarked 
even before the war began that “disloyalty ‘was not a subject on which there 
was room for …debate'” because “Disloyal individuals …had sacrificed their 
right to civil liberties.” 55 Wilson sought a Congressional declaration of war in 
1917 despite the lack of an armed conflict involving United States (US) forces. 
The intense debate over the war resolution focused on whether Wilson had 
correctly justifiably sought a full grant wartime executive powers and whether 
the country was, indeed, at war. After ignoring dissenters in Congress and 
obtaining a full grant of wartime power, Wilson quickly created the Committee 
on Public Information (CPI) to mobilize public opinion in favor of war. Further, 
he compelled passage of the Espionage Act and its amendments to provide law 
enforcement with the “necessary tools for ensuring loyalty” to the 
administration's war policy. The Federalists' claim that eliminating dissent to the 
war policy was essential for its success was central to Wilson's defense of the 
Act. Wilson's treatment of dissent before World War I brings the normalization 
of wartime executive power into a more clear light. 
The norm of executive wartime power established across these three 
conflicts created a more than temporary limitation on First Amendment rights 
because it emboldened future Presidents like Wilson to assert wartime powers 
in half-wars. By World War I, the act of labeling those who disagreed with the 
war plan as disloyal to the nation had become part of the normal political 
debate. Wilson's Espionage Act, like Adams' Sedition Act, was a partisan 
attempt to legislate wartime political conformity. It effectively turned back the 
clock on the advancements Lincoln had made by articulating free speech as 
just a piece of a larger theory of balancing. Understanding how the executive's 
power to suppress dissent during wartime became normal governmental 
practice in early United States history can shed light on modern wartime 
complexities. As time passes and new cases arise, the courts will be charged 
with answering two key questions: is the War on Terror a half-war and is 
domestic counter-terrorism an exertion of wartime executive power? 
Conclusion 
Page 14 of 18Why the Judiciary Should Protect First Amendment Political Speech During Wartime
8/31/2007http://www.lurj.org/article.php/vol2n1/firstamend.xml
The three historical episodes discussed herein demonstrate that the 
executive branch has consistently opposed public discussion of the war policy. 
The quick reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2006 raises questions 
about whether or not the executive branch can make its temporary counter-
terrorism powers permanent. Leone astutely observes that, in the War on 
Terror, “The struggle …could continue for generations, and we run the risk of 
finding ourselves on a slippery slope, making decisions in which freedoms that 
are set aside for the ‘emergency' become permanently lost to us.” 56 In a war 
that is potentially unending, it is all the more incumbent upon on the judicial 
branch to solidify First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court's holding in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) during the height of World 
War II offered such clarity: “if there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics.” 57 Here, as Shiffrin says, the count finally recognized that 
“democracy and dissent ran together.” 58 In order to “petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances” 59 pursuant to the First Amendment, citizens must 
have an understanding of the war policy and of the executive's wartime 
conduct. Without the guarantee of communicative liberty in the public forum, 
the public's only avenue for petition is through the legislative branch. This paper 
argues that citizens cannot trust the legislature during wartime to respect 
dissent and must rely on legal strategies to forge effective political 
communication about the war. 
The three historical trends discussed herein—secrecy, the ebb and flow of 
precedent, and the length of wartime—raise necessary questions about the 
commitment of individuals and their government to the values of trust and 
tolerance during wartime. Can we trust the present-day executive branch to 
effectively execute the War on Terror given past deceptions? More importantly, 
can the executive branch trust individual human reason to prevail in the 
marketplace of ideas? Will the courts hold, as Posner has already suggested, 
that radical Islamic rhetoric is a certain trigger to terrorist action? The answers 
to these questions will likely determine the direction of First Amendment rights 
during wartime in the United States' War on Terror. 
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